The onset of constitutional democracy in South Africa potentially marked a critical juncture in the evolution of its innovation system. At this point the Ministry responsible for science and technology adopted the innovation systems approach. This adoption followed the IDRCOECD-style review of 1993. Nineteen years later, after a fully-fledged OECD Review, the extent to which the innovation system demonstrates continuity or change may be assessed. The assessment is broadly functionalist, and considers the role of institutions, and actors.While the polity has become more inclusive, extractive economic institutions persist. Likewise the social contract between science and society has evolvedbut it continues to show extractive attributes. It appears that thus far the innovation systems approach has been more of a rhetorical than a practical device with the pre-1994 and present innovation systems showing both continuity and its own disjuncture.It is these challenges that the current Ministerial Review of the STI Landscape has sought to address.
Introduction
The 1994 inception of constitutional democracy in South Africa marked a critical juncture for the country. Political inclusion was guaranteed and the previously outlawed African National Congress came to power under the slogan 'a better life for all.' Eighteen years later wealth disparities, sluggish economic performance, severe health problems and services failures have not yielded thatpromise. GDP growth with a median value of 3,2% has remained below the targeted 6%and employment opportunities haveemerged for the hundreds of thousands entering the job market each year. The modernist agenda of 1994 has had to confront realities of resurgent traditionalism, racial exclusion, resource nationalism and international trade under WTO rule. Arguably the promise of 1994 has not come about even as the country has participated in the commodities super-cycle driven by the re-positioning of China on the world stage. Numerous commentators have studied the stickiness of South Africa's seeking answers in the economy (e.g. Dube et al 2007 , Terreblanche 2012 and politics (e.g. Plaut and Holden 2012) .
South Africa hosts a small innovation system that has achieved notable historic successes, some of societal benefit (organ transplantation) and some less so (weapons of mass destruction). Great expectations were thus placed on theinnovation system as a contributor to the modernist agenda and transformation of society. Indeed the White paper that introduced the innovation systems 'approach' argued that the 'national system of innovation will be central to the empowerment of all South Africans as they seek to achieve social, political, economic and environmental goals' (DACST 1996:8) .
This paper seeks to understand the evolution of the national system of innovation over the short period of democratic governance and the extent to which it has met the objectives that were laid out when the innovation systems approach was adopted. In particular it was argued that '… a national system of innovation can only be judged as healthy if the knowledge, technologies, products and processes produced by the national system of science, engineering and technology have been converted into increased wealth, by industry and business, and into an improved quality of life for all members of society' (DACST, 1996: 19) . The onset of democracy has lead to a change in political institutions, but the economic structure remains largely unchanged. This, given its economic linkages suggests that the innovation system is likelyto exhibit similar lack of change. If so, what shape might a future innovation system take, and what can government do to facilitate such change?
This analysis seeks to break new ground in addressing the underlying drivers responsible for the lack of change. In so doing it takes a different point of departure to that of other writers on South Africa's innovation policy. Pouris (2007) usesscientometrics to seek evidence of shifts in emphasis; Mouton (2003) takes a socio-historic stance characterizingthe system as exhibiting three phases: amateur science from 1806 to 1948); the institutionalized science of the Apartheid era ; andthe third transition of the post-1994 period. Kaplan (2004; 2008) appeals to STI indicators to offer anevidence-based analysis of the R&D and innovation policies post 1994 and finds numerous instances of contradictions between the assertions of the National Research and Development Strategy (DST, 2002) and Innovation Plan (DST, 2008) with the underlying facts on the ground. Whilst pointing to underlying problems facing the development of a robust innovation system these authors stop short of offering reasons for the shortcomings.
It is this gap that is explored in the paper. To this end a functionalist approach is followed to analyze historical context, policy intent and implementation. Attention is focused on the system institutions and actors to tease out a rational explanation of the status quo, and the way that regulation has been used to maintain or effect social change (Burrell and Morgan 1979) . It is contended that this analysis is compatible with the innovation systems approach as laid out by Lundvall(1985) , Freeman(1987) , and more recently Lundvall et al 2009 . The innovation systems approachdraws on the principles of evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter 1992) with innovation systems involving back and forth interaction between demand and supply, knowledge accumulation and path dependence. Three reviews that provide an objective appraisal are pivotal to the analayis. The first is the Mission Report of the IDRC review -Towards a Science and Technology Policy for a Democratic South Africa (IDRC 1993) . The second istheOECD Review of South Africa's Innovation Policy of 2006 (OECD 2007 . These two Reviews willy-nilly anchor the science and innovation policy debate within an OECD economic policy framework.The third is the Report of the Ministerial Review Committee (DST 2012) that at time of writing was awaiting Cabinet ratification.
The paper including this introduction is structured around seven sections. The second examines the evolution of the innovation system of the Apartheid years, the period of the 'Apartheid developmental state.'The next covers the period from the 1980s thatsaw a drift toward neo-liberalism. The fourthsection covers the period of the three democratic administrations from 1994 to 2009. Section five then examines the period of policy contestation, starting with the 2007 OECD Review and moving into the early years of the present Zuma administration. The sixth section considers the recommendations of the Ministerial Review Committee and the final section offers concluding remarks and suggestions for policy.
The Apartheid Developmental State and Innovation System 1.0 From the 1870s South Africa, an agglomeration of two Crown Colonies, two Boer Republics, and numerous African chieftaincies, experienced a mining-led industrial revolution. Over 1880-1910competition for this wealth led tounification under the British Crown and the immiseration and dispossession of the indigenous peoples. Apartheid emerged as a specific means of ensuring settler hegemony and the interests of mining capital (Simons and Simons 1983) . Apartheidthen generated a specific form of developmental state(ECA2011) that over 1910 to 1980 placed the commanding heights of the economy in state hands. Pre-1994 South Africaneatly fits descriptionas an extractive political and economic system (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).
In due course the state developed the public components of the innovation system of the day, comprising ethnically based universities and public research organisations (PROs). By the end of Apartheid in 1994 there were thirty-six universities and 'technikons', eight research performing Science Councils and another fifty or so PROs, as well a host of research and development laboratories in the private sector, supported by scientific and technological services and associations.
At the heart of the public sector was the CSIR, founded in 1945.That organization, closely modeled on model of other the British Commonwealth PROs quickly diversified its activities and spun out many of the future PROs. MeiringNaude and Brown (1977: 79) state its leitmotif as the principle that 'Research cannot be dictated and organized from above; it must grow from within the organization,' a variation on the original linear model often attributed to VannevarBush. One measure of CSIRdominance is revealed through its USPTO awards. Around 100 USPTO awards were made to South African assignees annually over the last three decades while over 1985 to 2004 CSIR accounted for around a quarter of all thesepatents.Other state institutions that played a decisive role in the economy and war machine were electricity utility Eskom, iron and steel producer ISCOR, the coal-to-gasoline company SASOL, the Atomic Energy Corporation, and the various companies associated with the Armaments Corporation of South Africa. These were strong institutions that worked to ensure state dominance. Links to the private sector came through the then State Security Council. The innovation systemassociated with the Apartheid developmental state produced world-class science in catalysis, environmental science, clinical medicine, metallurgy, plant and animal sciences linked into various sectoral systems of innovation. Indeed the1993 IDRC Mission declared that it was 'struck by the extensive capability of South Africa's science and technology system … it constitutes a major asset which a new government will need both to nurture and mobilize' (IDRC 1993, viii) .One thus is justified in describing this as Innovation System 1.0.
To maintain morale in the face of the international academic boycott the state in the mid 1980s introduced two innovations: a system for rating individual scientists who would receive personal funding according to their prowess, and a journal subsidy system to reward publication in domestic and international peer reviewed journals. Innovation System 1.0 might be seen as resting on a social contract between scientists and the Apartheid developmental state: on one hand to deliver the technological means to support the economy and Apartheid's warfare state; on the hand to enjoy freedom to conduct open-ended scientific inquiry.
This focus on individualsgoes some way towards explaining why it is that a South Africa over time has consistently devoted 20% of gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) to basic research. It also explains how it is that the country hassuccoured four Nobel Laureates in the sciences and achieved notable scientific, medical and technological successes including the world's first human heart transplant and significant work on early hominids, astronomy and astrophysics. As such Innovation System 1.0 fits the Acemoglu-Robinson parameters of an extractive set of institutions, collectively and individually. (White) scientists were admired and feted by Government; the Black majority was excluded.
The slide to neo-liberalism
There is a belief that that it was the post-1994 ANC that introduced the neo-liberal economic agenda to South Africa (Antentas, 2006) . This is not the case. South Africac.1980 displayed concentrations of power:national industries; and the mining finance houses. The latter, that operated under strict capital controls,expanded into energy, forestry,engineering, automobiles, banking, insurance and leisure and operated according to market needs.The Apartheid developmental state combined market liberalism with a large public sector, administered pricing regimes, state marketing boards and a many laws intended to ensure racial privilege.
However by 1979 the pressure of sanctions, the internal civil war and wars in Angola and Mozambique, the cost of Apartheid'sown Balkan states (the 'Bantustans'), and rising labourcosts led to financial stringency. The first consequence was the privatization ofSASOL. Arguably this point marked the zenith of the Apartheid developmental state that then began to yield to pragmatic political change and structural adjustment. In 1981 the railways and ports were corporatized into SA Transport Services, and 1989 saw the sale of stateiron and steel conglomerate ISCOR; agriculture was deregulated in 1992.
By that point however, a shift in the economic thinking of the liberation movement wasoccurring. Its neo-Keynesian Reconstruction and Development Programmewasto be the mainstay of electoral campaigning, but another positionwas forming. The neo-liberalism of the late Apartheid years segued into that of the successor democratic state.
From IDRC Reviewto Innovation System 1.1
The new order that Archbishop Tutu termed the 'rainbow nation,' inherited the largest economy in Africa complete with the only innovation system on the continent worthy of that name. The 1994 Government of National Unity retained the principles of a mixed economy and continued with limited privatization of state assets. By this point in time the economy was strongly services-led with the primary sector at 13%, secondary at 24% and services 63% of GDP.
This local political change occurred in a rapidly changing geo-political environment. Already in 1992 the moribund National Party government had relaxed its foreign investment rules so that leading firms could expand abroad. South Africa on 1 January 1995 acceded to the newly established World Trade Organization, and local industry, already deprived of the large military contracts of the Apartheid years and now facing the elimination of protective tariffs, was encouraged to surge northwards. Today's market leaders now generate close to fifty percent of their revenues abroad.
The emphasis on continuity laid down in the Constitution naturally shaped participation in the economy. While retaining its underlying structure, business was to be open to all who had the means to find a way in. The economy would be 'inclusive.' An innovation, 'black economic empowerment' later enshrined in law, entailed the purchase by the 'previously disadvantaged' of equity stakes in companies that were funded with loan capital to be repaid through expected dividend flows. This concession on the part of capital has earlier precedence. In 1963 Anglo American, as a strategy to promote Afrikaner capital sold General Mining Union Corporation (Gencor) to FederaleMynbou. In due course Gencorbecame a component of BHP Billiton, by revenue now the second largest mining company in the world after Glencore.
Arguably the economy retained its 'extractive' character -driven by skills shortages senior management was able to extract super salaries; labour unions, not to be outdone, restricted the growth of formal employment and raised their wages. Employment equity law provided the means for 'previously disadvantaged individuals' to enter the workplace. While quotas were illegal, they operated under the radar, with few legal challenges being raised. Fundamentally however the economic structure remained unchanged; the new state was unable to drive developmentalist policies in the style of the Asian Tigers as it was shackled by the power of a strong labour movement that campaigned according to the ILO concept of decent work. Any idea of special economic zones where more flexible labour regulation might apply was rejected out of hand. The cost of labour rose; the cost of doing business remained high. To mitigate the effects of such economic exclusion, the warfare state became a welfare state with some 15 million persons receiving state benefits.
What then the post Apartheid Innovation System? The1993 IDRC hadadopted the standard OECDinnovation system review methodology -a country self-review, an inward visit of experts, and the presentation of the Mission Report for country response.TheMission then found 'a highly fragmented group of institutions … frequently described by officials ….as dysfunctional … (with) a leadership vacuum on S&T at ministerial level ' (idem: 22) . Resource allocations were frozen, priorities were skewed away from the challenges facing the country, its institutions were racially biased, and there was 'a crisis in the educational system at all levels' (idem: 23). A particular concern was that the boards of statutory bodies should in future be representative of the full range of interests and be demographically representative, and have hiring and firing powers. It also suggested a number of social missions for S&T -housing, electrification, water and education, and that foresight methods be used to set research priorities.
The Mission carried out its deliberations evenas the Interim Constitution of 1993 was being finalized. This guaranteed continuity of services and pensions, employment, and property rights. The new polity was to be inclusive. In response to the IDRC Mission and other policy processes, notably the Science and Technology Initiative (STI), the new Departmentcrafted a Green Paper on S&T, followed by a White Paper (DACST 1996) .Alongside came the planning for a Research and Technology foresight study. CSIR staff played strong roles in the STI, the Green and White Papers and the Foresight.
The White Paperset out to make the seminal proposal toadopt the innovation systems approach. This was in keeping with a government-wide attempt to distance the new dispensation from the Apartheid past. This distancing naturally involved both symbols (new national flag, national anthem, national crests) and rhetorical devices. So for example Treasury came forward with zero-based budgeting, Health declared an essential national health agenda, and Education introduced a novel outcomes-based curriculum.
For its part the White Paper proclaimed 'A well-managed and properly functioning national system of innovation will make it possible for all South Africans to enjoy the economic, socio-political and intellectual benefits of science and technology.' Such use of rhetoric has of course occurred elsewhere. Sharif(2009: 410) writing on the innovation policy of Hong Kong noted that:'Instead of establishing policiesthat incorporate principal elements of the IS approach into their content,Hong Kong has traded on the growing prestige of the approach to enhance theperception that its development policies leverage the latest trends in academicresearch.'The problem of policy rhetoric isfarfrom unique to South Africa.
To enable a well-functioning innovation system the White Paper declared that Government (ibid. 20) would ensure that:
1. South Africa has in place a set of institutions, organisations and policies which give effect to the various functions of a national system of innovation 2. There is a constructive set of interactions among those institutions, organisations and policies and 3. There is in place an agreed upon set of goals and objectives which are consonant with an articulated vision of the future which is being sought This would be achieved by government addressing 4. Policy formulation and resource allocation at the national level, and 5. Regulatory policy-making 6. Performance-level financing of innovation-related activities 7. Performance of innovation-related activities 8. Human resource development and capacity building 9. Provision of infrastructure. 10. Performance measurement and evaluation, and 11. Knowledge transfer.
The White Paper recommendations were then implemented with statutes introduced to create a National Advisory Council on Innovation (NACI) and consolidation of grant making in the National Research Foundation. It set out a range of instruments needed to achieve the otherintroduction of competitive grants; review of the Science Councils; establishing a system of performance measurement and monitoring. Competitive grants were housed in anInnovation Fund that held out the promise of steering the system. After incubating in DACST for two years the Innovation Fundmoved to the new National Research Foundation.The subsequent Science, Engineering and Technology Institutions reviews of 1997 brought a first round of external, independent scrutiny to bear on the Science Councils, but did not alter the size and shape of the institutional landscape. The Foresight Studyof 1995-1999was already underway when the White Paper was adopted. It drew on the experience of foresight studies of the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands, adopting an eclectic mix of the UK panel and German Delphi methods. Key differenceswere that three of the South African panels had social goals, andpanel members were not only younger, but displayed a good gender and group balance.Another difference was that the findings focusedmore on the medium than the long term. Some of the panel reports suggest institutional capture (e.g. Energy) while others were somewhat constrained (Security). Generally the Foresight offered few surprises other than its abrupt end afterthe tabling of its results at a high-profile Presidential-level event. Its main legacywas in opening of careers in government for the youngerpanel coordinators and members.
Nextcame the 2001 Biotechnology Strategy that sought tobuild competences in third generation biotechnologies. Its authors urged that efforts be made to face up to the AIDS pandemic. In the event neither of these intentions were realized. Instead the Biotechnology Strategy was used to create four Biotechnology Regional Innovation Centres that signaled the desire of DACST to stretch its mandate beyond its national constraints. This was followed by the National Research and Development Strategy (DST 2002) . The Strategy takes a starting point six factors: the ending of Apartheid's military technology missions, a security perspective, concern that the science workforce was overwhelmingly white, male and ageing, a claimed reduction in business R&D, a need better to control intellectual property, and fragmented governance structures. To bridge these gaps itdeclared five 'new'supply-side technology missions -ICT, biotechnology, technology for manufacturing, exploitation of natural resources, and technology for poverty reduction. Central to the thinking of the Strategy was a schematic (Figure 1 ) as shown below. This schematic appears to have been constructed using CSIR's scenario planning software.
[ Figure 1 about here] The upward arrows from R&D activity toward the central block 'technical progressimprovement and innovation,' amount to endorsement of the linear model. This is surprising, coming but six years after the adoption of the innovation systems approach that is predicated on non-linearity. The rhetoric of innovation systems and change was rapidly found wanting. At least three of the six factors underpinning the Strategy reflect a disjuncture between fact and opinion. For a start the reduction in military R&D began in 1988 with the withdrawal from Angola. Secondly the 2001/02 R&D Survey shows that for the system as a whole white male researchers over forty-five years of age made up but 20% of the total number of researchersageing white males might characterize the universities but not the whole system. Also business R&D was up, not down. These factual disjunctures are odd given the claim of the Strategy to be 'indicator based.' One may take this critique yet further in questioning whether the claimed leakage of intellectual property that necessitated new legislation was real or imagined.
The R&D Strategy boldly set the target of GERD: GDP of 1% for financial year 2008/09to be accompanied by a doubling (in current Rands) of state funding. The doubling of state funding was achieved ahead of schedule, but was accompanied by equivalent rises in BERD and HERD as well as a rise in GDP, so that GERD: GDP peaked at 0,95% in 2007/07. The attainment of the much-vaunted 1% still eluded the innovation system out to 2009/10.
Most observers would concur that the system shows fragmentation. Then again this is an international phenomenon. To deal with this the Strategy terminated of the centralizing Science Vote, with Science Councils budgets now coming from line departments. There was also a significant shift of reporting lines with CSIR moving from the Department of Trade and Industry to DST. To ensure coordination DST proposed that it shouldmonitorgovernment R&D budgets and expenditure andtable an annual report on these moneys to the National Assembly. However compilation proved to be impossible, and the attempt to gather R&D datawas abandoned in favour of monitoringscientific and technological activities. That proved to be as difficult a call, with four years of trial and error needed to obtain a reasonably comprehensive estimate.
Other institutional change was to be the creation of two organs, the Foundation for Technological Innovation and the Institute for the Promotion of Science. The former eventually took form as the Technology Innovation Agency; the latter was stillborn.
As to the provision of human resources for the innovation system, one found stasis in higher education and slow growth in the Science Councils. The near doubling of researchers in the business sector reflected organic growth, and improved R&D Survey coverage (HSRC, 2010) . It may be contended that neither the White Paper nor the R&D Strategy brought about real shifts in the research agendas of the Science Councils. Without a shared guiding vision each Science Council drives its own policy.
South Africa's is a tragic story of the damage that racial exclusion brings with it. The 1950s destruction of the few avenues of quality education for the majority has consequences into the present, two generation later. For a variety of reasons the education system still fails to generate enough school completers for the science-based careers that must be part of a growing economy. The Global Competitiveness Indices for South Africa tell their own story: on the one hand the country was4 th for Financial Market Development; it was131 st for Health and Primary Education (WEF 2011). Only one other country in the GCI shows such disparities in its GCI scores and 'basic requirements' (health, basic education) and that is the United States. South Africa is an outlier with its huge Gini coefficient and class and racially stratified life indicators. Its school system though absorbing funds in line with international norms, lags behind in terms of outputs. The reasons for this poor performance go beyond the scope of this paper.
Regarding demographics, in 1994 but 5% of graduatestaff in the Science Councils were persons of colour (Motala 1994) . Today, drawing on the data offered in Science Council annual reports, one finds that upwards of 50% of researchers are black. This is a profound shift in a relatively short time, and points to the power of state institutions to pursue the new racial agenda of redress. Measured by the production of PhDs graduates the initial upward trend saturated at 1 300 a year, a quarter of whom were foreign students that were in nay case required to exit the country upon completion of their studies. What of higher education research? Kahn (2010) examined change in the higher education research agenda by considering World of Science publication counts by subject area. This showed the persistence of traditional areas of competence in plant sciences, and medicine and the environment, corresponding to the continuation of the 'bi-environmental model' (Glanzel 2000) . However the response of the health sciences to the HIV epidemic has seen infectious diseases, public, environmental & occupational health and immunology leap in prominence. This shift occurred in spite of, not because of government policy.
Innovation policy instruments impacting on the business sector include an enhanced tax incentive for R&D the regulation of benefit sharing of intellectual property arising from public funds. The impact of this law is as yet unclear. Considerable policy attention was also given to indigenous knowledge to protect local knowledge and biodiversity. A thread common to these laws is a fear that something intangible is being lost, or spirited away, what might be termed intangible resource nationalism that parallels the resource nationalism associated with natural resource rent seeking. A case may also be made that the prowess of the offshore economy draws upon the 'home-based research' of the innovation system, with its world class research universities, competent Science Councils, and extensive international networks, as found in high levels of participation in the EU Framework Programmes. For one moment in time DST was a policy driver and it used the chance to set up the South African Research Chairs Initiative (SARChI) eventhough this intruded on the terrain of the Department of Education. With Treasury support SARChIgot off to a good start in 2006, but over the next two years stumbled as Mbeki's star waned, and the global financial meltdown struck. Even so SARChI is the most innovative effort by DST to address the human resources nexus. By design SARChIfocuses on individuals, many of whom were already research leaders, rather than on research groups and thus amounts to a continuation of individualistic science.
Measured by the total FTE of research personnel the innovation system showed but slight growth. The volume of scientific publication rose, andthe country world share of scientific publications remained fairly steady. An unsung achievement was that the country retained its standing in the top fifteen of countries registering plant varieties.
Considerable skill was evident in the building of the SA Large Telescope and in preparing a bid for the USD 2 billion Square Kilometre Array.In May 2012 South Africa and Australia became joint awardees of the project.
It has been shown that small changes aside, the post-1994 innovation system demonstrates institutional continuity with its predecessor. The underlying thrust of innovation policy remains squarely on supply side measures through which scientists decide on priorities and are funded accordingly. Where the IDRC Review had castigated Innovation System 1.0 as uncoordinated and fragmented, Innovation System 1.1 might be criticized for being even more so. Nor did the 'new' innovation system directly address the housing, energy, electrification needs that IDRC had identified.The innovation system did not generate major innovations that captured public attention, aside from numerous products for the mobile telephony and digital TV industries. Patenting remained at around 100 per year, reflecting the lack of growth in high-tech exports, while SASOL displaced CSIR as the leading institutional patentee. Cumulative investments in the order of ZAR 3 billion made through the Innovation Fund and Biotechnology Regional Innovation Centresgave rise to no major breakthroughs. The attempt to enter the electric vehicle market with the Joule battery-powered car yielded a comely body, but no market interest. The ZAR300 million investment came to nothing.
It is for these reasons that the post-1994 innovation system might well be labeled Innovation System 1.1.It did not exhibit a fundamental shift from the preceding Innovation System 1. This was the situation when the OECD review was instituted.
Policy contestation The2007 OECD innovation policy review followed the standard three-stage process, with NACI preparing the self assessment (NACI 2006) . Again a number of CSIR personnel were central to this process. The Review itself was tabled in March 2007 (OECD 2007) and acknowledged that 'the most striking achievement of South Africa has simply been to defy the extremely poor framework conditions facing the innovation system in the early 1990s' (OECD 2007).
It noted that there was a small core of technologically strong innovation-performing business enterprises, coupled with a well-performing university and research institute system but of a scale suited to a much smaller population. Despite the desire for knowledge-based development and growth, and state-of-art policy instruments there were large problems that called for significant reshaping of the system that lacked a holistic governance structure. Fundamentally the country was held back by its weak school system, and the innovation system was running down through natural ageing. What was needed was a rethink of the role of the state in the innovation system, along with serious attention to address the 'engineering gap' that displayed weaknesses in design, engineering, entrepreneurial and management and R&D capacity.
The Review identified the need to review the declared priorities; define some missions by sectors and user problems (demand-side) and to use innovation to develop the 'second economy.' In essence the 2007 OECD review was declaring that the imperatives of the 1993 IDRC review had not been met. The Mandela administration Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology (DACST) and its successor Department of Science and Technology (DST) introduced best of breed innovation policy instruments similar to those found in OECD countries yet there was little evidence of change. Hence the contention that the label Innovation System 1.1 is appropriate.
Consonant with the IDRC Review of 1993, a consonance more likely by accident than intent, the major governance recommendations of the OECD Review were to establish a cabinet level body to generate holistic research and innovation policy; to re-think the structure and role of NACI; to improve cross-government coordination; to rethink the range and function of the Science Councils; and to improve mechanisms for strategic intelligence.
The tabling of the OECD Review was eclipsed by the near simultaneous launch of the Ten Year Plan for Innovation (DST, 2008) that had been in preparation since late 2006. Indeed the main public response of DST to the OECD Review was to note its endorsement of the value of an intermediary organization such as the Foundation for Technological Innovation (FTI) as mooted in the draft Plan document. For unknown reasons no DST response to the Review was disseminated; nor was the NACI's Ministerial adviceon the Review placed in the public domain.
In due course the Foundation for Technological Innovation, first suggested in the 2002 R&D Strategy, was established as the Technological Innovation Agency (TIA), but without significant new funding. This was achieved by bundling together the Innovation Fund, the BRICs, technology incubators and the advanced manufacturing facility at CSIR. One might speculate that creating FTI/TIA was the overarching goal of DST and thatit naturally used the OECD Review to garner support. Aresponse to the OECD Review could wait.
The TIA came about through institutional re-arrangement, not a greenfield process. This migration of organizations is a feature of the public sector of the innovation system. The Plan, constructed internally by DST, aligns itself with the theme of Grand challenges found in many similar plans such as those of India, Brazil and the United States. It advocates five Grand Challenges -biotechnology, energy, space science and technology, climate change, and 'human and social dynamics' that are intended 'to drive the transformation of the South African economy to a knowledge economy ' (DST 2008, 4) . According to the World Economic Forum global competitiveness indicators, South Africa is presently a 'stage 2' efficiency driven economy (WEF 2011) by contrast with Brazil that is in transition to 'stage 3,' the innovation economy.
The tenor of the Plan is more of a vision statement than a nuts and bolts plan, and is avowedly supply side driven. So far no budgets have been declared in public.
On the economic front the Mbeki administration (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) faced with low growth and high unemployment sought the resources of the Harvard Centre for International Development. Their recommendations came after two years of work(Hausmann2007) -sustained economic growth with job creation required re-orientation toward the export of manufactured goods in the mode of Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. Shortages of high-level skills were a binding constraint, whose absence restricted the utilization of unskilled labour. A rise in manufactured exports would automatically lead to a rise in employment across the board. The deeper problem lay in labour market inflexibility and the low level of training of the workforce.
Trade union resistance lay in the path of dealing with both of these binding constraints. Capital for its part was making use of global opportunities and was deterred from committing to South Africa with its complex political environment. Comparisons with Malaysia over the period of its New Economic Policy are warranted: that country expanded the state role and offered generous tax and race policy exemptions to foreign capital and attracted some of the highest rates of FDI yet seen. South Africa took a cautious neo-liberal approach and insisted that all parties accord with employment equity and capital equity regulations. FDI was modest and mainly flowed to acquisitions rather than greenfield investment. Most importantly for this discussion, the DST for the first time came under the direction of an ANC Minister, the former Minister of Education, a member of the ANC National Executive Committee. The policy actions of this new Minister are addressed separately below.
Over at the Department of Trade and Industry,also under a Communist Party Minister, the Industrial Policy Action Plan(DTI 2011) was fine-tuned to address the priorities of the new administration. But the Industrial Policy Action Plan(IPAP) lacks focus and in the conventional sense is not industrial policy. Interestingly the CSIR is the only Science Council mentioned in IPAP. Why similar roles are not extended to the other Science Councils is perplexing. IPAP is a product of the DTI; CSIR reported to DTI until 2004; DTI bureaucrats 'understand' CSIR; maybe this explains why it forms such a strong part of their thinking, or is this an example of system capture?
The New Growth Pathshows amélange of interests at work. So it calls for focusand is thus at odds with IPAP's broad-brush style. EDD was created without any significant new funds and must thus use the resources it gained at birth namely the Competition Commission and the behemoth Industrial Development Corporation. It thus no surprise that the New Growth Path makes strong appeals for the elimination of cartels and other forms of unfair competition.
To add to the complexity of interests the Zuma Administration created a new Department for Performance Monitoring, Evaluation and Administration within the Presidency. This Department seeks to demonstrate government accountability through the signature of performance agreements between Ministers and the President. Unfortunately some of these agreements include targets that are inconsistentwith pre-existing targets of cognate departments.
For its part the National Planning Commission (NPC)NationalDiagnosticsaid little about innovation, R&D and technology, being content to repeat the indicators of the Ten Year Innovation Plan even though these were now jeopardized by the inconsistent targets in the performance agreements. The NPCVision for 2030 then set out to describe a futuresociety of inclusion, improved standards of living and societal wellbeing. The Vision seeks to modernize and transform the economy, and society, and build a 'capable state' reminiscent of the 'intelligent regime' that Raul Prebisch advocated more than a half century ago. Fundamentally 'The national development plan proposes to invigorate and expand the economic opportunity through investment in infrastructure, more innovation, private investment and entrepreneurialism. The economy will absorb more labour -especially of new work seekersand wage moderation at all levels will contribute to rising employment' and further 'revolutionary developments in science and technology that will transform opportunities, introduce new risks, and drive wider social integration' (NPC2011,1).
What is encouraging is that the Vision places innovation central to the development process. This is a bold move, albeit somewhat confusion in the detail. The reasons for this confusion are easy to point to; much more difficult to fix. So while it is important that Vision for 2030 recognizes that 'science and technology are key to development' and that 'innovation is the primary driver of technological growth' the Vision would benefit from a clear statement as to what is meant by the concepts of innovation, and an innovation system. Moreover it avers 'The investment climate is crucial, as are the right incentive structures, to guide the allocation of resources, and to encourage research and development' that in turn calls for an 'increase in the size and effectiveness of the innovation system, and closer alignment with companies that operate in sectors consistent with the growth strategy.' Massive investments in infrastructure will be needed, along with a shift toward a low carbon economy, and this in a country that is currently one of the highest per capita carbon dioxide producers in the world.
While the Vision also shows elements of supply side and linear model thinking, it shows a keen appreciation of the importance of organizational learning and competence building. But there is one statement that requires serious reconsideration. Perhaps fearing the creative destruction associated with a shift toward export led manufacturing it argues that 'The best solution is for the state to play an active role both in funding research and development and in guiding the type of research and development that the private and public sectors conduct. Despite an excellent set of science institutions, research priorities are not always consistent with South Africa's competitive advantage or growth strategy. Often we are looking far afield, when the base for innovation and new product development are linked to existing industries and firms.' This assumes that the state alone is truly capable of making such well-informed choices.
The picture that emerges is of an administration riven with conflicting views. Treasury has fought a rearguard action to maintain macro-economic stability whilelabour has extracted wage settlements running at double the CPI. The Ministerial Review Committee its Report was in circulation for public comment in May 2012. In essence the Committee, based on its own inquiries and commissioned research, found itself in overall agreement with the OECD Review findings, noting that there had been limited if any follow-up (DST 2012).
The Committee detected a lack of common understanding of the concept of an innovation system; that DST had been unable to exercise a coordinating role; that attempts to enter into collaborative agreement even with the Department of Education had been stillborn; there was no evidence of system-wide planning; NACI was constrained to advise on a very narrow range of activities; supply-side thinking remained dominant with emphasis on the linear model. Moreover there was no common purpose among business, government, higher education and civil society regarding decision-making and an agenda for economic investment and development.
In other words the reviews of IDRC, OECD and the Ministerial Committee spread over nearly two decades of time, were in broad agreement.The system had barely changed.
The Committee set out to promote a demand-led inclusive innovation system subject to good governance. Its main recommendationsare to: This represents a wide sweep intended to re-orient the innovation system away from supply-side, linear model thinking, to a growing, demand-led, interactive system, Innovation System 2.0 in the making. To arrive at a strong expression of demand that minimizes sectional interests the proposed high level body, the NCRI would be constituted to carry out this determination. This is the sentinel recommendation of the Ministerial Review Committee.
The proposals are the work of a Committee; how these are to be implemented is an unknown, the more so as the economic policy environment is so strongly contested.
Summative assessment and concluding remarks This paper has argued that the extractive economic institutions of the past have continued into the present. Whilst the polity is more inclusive, the economy remains extractive. The innovation system, as a small sub-system of the economy inevitably mirrors the overarching polity and economic forms. It was argued that Innovation System 1.0 'worked' for apartheid.In effect the continuity prescribed in the 1996 Constitution saw to it that thatinnovation system continued in largely unchanged orientation and approach. Henceits designation as Innovation System 1.1.
Despite rhetorical adherence to the innovation systems approach policy remained fixed on supply side measures consistent with the linear model of innovation.The CSIR, one of the loci of linear model thinking has remained a core institution of the innovation system and continues to exercise strong influence on policy formulation and implementation.
Much institutional change in the innovation system has been superficial and involved reconfiguration rather than change of focus. The IDRC Review of 1993, the 2007 OECD Review, and the Ministerial Committee of 2012 agree on this continuity and the lock in of linear model thinking. In addition the focus on the individual scientist rather than research group inadvertently promotes extractive behaviours. These are the underlying reasons that explain the continuity.
This unintended continuity was very neatly revealed in a training workshop conducted for DST policy staff in May 2010. Asked to provide a back-of-business card description of the main features of theinnovation system, the staff compiled a list of attributes virtually identical with the IDRC diagnosis of 1993. Addressing the facilitator a staffer lamented 'You're saying nothing has changed.'The facilitator replied: 'No, you are saying that.'The systemic failures are available to those that wish to see.
Asummative assessment of the functioning of the innovation system may be carried out withreference to the White Paper's owncriteria. Table 1 lists these criteria (adjusted for conciseness) with a summative assessment of each.
[ Table 1 about here] This summative assessment indicates the strengths and weaknesses (shown as boldface) of the system as is. As assessed each attribute shows some evidence of success and even failure.
A case in point is the level of international patenting. The economy has continued in extractive mode and has shifted attention abroad, using home-based R&D and innovation to capture and retain markets. The emphasis on commodity exports and non-tradables, with parallel falls in the volume of high technology exports resonates in the continuing low level of international patenting. There are both gains and losses in such industrial strategy.
Under Apartheid the social contract of science involved support for the war effort along with the pursuit of 'own science,' an activity of modernity supported by the taxpayer.
The social contract of science of the democratic era has yet to gel, but this much is clear: the Republic of Science is alive and well. It responded bravely to the HIV -TB pandemic. South Africa's small innovation system previously yielded heart transplants, nuclear weapons, guided missiles, catalysis, the Rooivalk attack helicopter, major palaeo-archeological finds, the G5 and G6 howitzers, and electronic detonators. The post 1994 system has yielded Thawte internet security, Ubuntu open source software, the South African Large Telescope, Karoo Array telescope and finally the Square Kilometre Array (SKA).
The space in which scientists supported the apartheid war has also seen occupancy by pet projects -the massive and now discontinued Pebble Bed Modular Reactor, and the Joule electric vehicle, that attracted many of the researchers from the state defence industries. It is possible that the lack of clear direction from government has allowed pet projects to flourish, in the hope that something grand with commercial value will emerge. The media frenzy that greeted the award of the SKA was akin to that associated with South Africahosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup, this despite no obvious future economic return from the huge investment in infrastructure. That Africa, through South Africa, would gain the lion's share of the multi-billion dollar SKA international science project was a delight to government. It is undeniable that SKA will gather staggering volumes of data that will far exceed today's global computing power, implying that new data processing techniques will be needed. This is a similar challenge to what CERN faced, and as one knows, an outcome of thatchallenge was http, the basis of today's World Wide Web.No one can predict what the technological benefits of SKA will be.
In terms of economic benefit it is an open question whether a large international project can spur local industry since its procurement processes will have to be open to all players, and cost is likely to be the main factor determining the award of contracts. SKA is thus unlikely seriously to impact on job creation. It is big science, not the socially oriented science that the IDRC Mission or OECD Review envisaged.
It may be too much to expect that thefuture National Council on Research and Innovation will 
